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Abstract. Negotiation between agents aims at reaching an agreement
in which the conflicting interests of agents are accommodated. In this
demonstration, we present a concrete negotiation scenario where two
agents are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where
they will meet. Their individual preferences match with a minimal dis-
tance computed from their partial knowledge of the environment. We
illustrate a bargaining protocol which allows agents to submit several
proposals at the same round and a negotiation strategy which consists
in starting from the best deal for the agent and then concedes. The path
between the agents emerges from the repeated negotiations.
1 Introduction
Multiagents systems (MAS) is a paradigm to analyze, to design and to imple-
ment systems made of autonomous entities interacting each other. These systems
are characterized by oppositions. These conflicts exist since agents have a local
perception of the environment and/or their own goals. In a MAS, the agents,
even if they are self-interested, must collaborate to reach their goals. Negotia-
tion is a form of interaction to reach a mutual agreement. This agreement can
be a resource allocation [1–6], a 2-side matching [7] or a collective decision [8].
The goals of the agents are conflicting since they cannot be fully satisfied at the
same time. In this perspective, negotiation is a distributed search in a potential
agreements space [9].
Many complex negotiation environments can be considered: multi-party ne-
gotiation (with more than two agents), multi-issue negotiation (the potential
agreements space is multi-dimensional), argumentation-based negotiation (offer
are attacked/defended), assumptions over the agents’ preferences (reservation
value, discount factor, deadline, etc.). Based on the principle of parsimony, we
study proposal-based bilateral single-issue negotiation in a companion paper [10].
We illustrate here our negotiation game in a concrete scenario where two agents
are situated in a maze and the negotiation outcome is a cell where they will
meet.
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2 Main Purpose
Tab. 2 situates our negotiation environment [10] wrt related works.
Many different negotiation environments have been studied in the literature:
– the object of negotiation can be single-issue or multi-issue, with discrete or
continuous issues;
– the agents’ preferences (2 or more) can be captured by preference relations
(denoted ) or utility functions (denoted u);
– the negotiation protocol can be symmetric or asymmetric, simultaneous or
successive, continuous or discrete, with or without deadline;
– the knowledge of agents about the opponents can be perfect or imperfect.
We distinguish two approaches to design multiagents negotiation. In the game-
theoretical approach, the negotiation environment is restricted to formally val-
idate the properties of the outcome (optimality) and of the process (stability,
computational complexity, distribution, etc.). In the heuristic-based approach
the negotiation environment is realistic but the properties are empirically eval-
uated. The imperfect information is the major difficulty for the first approach.
However, since we adopt the heuristic-based approach, we think this assumption
is crucial for practical application.
Table 1. Analysis grid of the literature according to the negotiation environment.
Nb
agents
Object Pref. Protocol Deadline Information
[1] 2 single continuous u symmetric si-
multaneous
no perfect
[2] 2 single continuous u asymmetric
successive
no perfect
[3] 2 multi continuous u asymmetric
successive
yes perfect /
imperfect
[4] 2 single continuous u asymmetric
successive
yes imperfect
[5] 2 single continuous u asymmetric
continuous
yes imperfect
[6] n multi continuous
/ discrete
u asymmetric
continuous
yes imperfect
[7] n single discrete  asymmetric
successive
no imperfect
[8] 2 single discrete  asymmetric
continuous
yes imperfect
[10] 2 single discrete  symmetric si-
multaneous
no imperfect
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3 Demonstration
We consider here two agents, Alice and Bob, which are paratroopers landed in
an unknown maze. They aim at meeting as soon as possible, i.e minimizing the
maximum number of steps for an agent to reach the meeting point. Both of
them have a local perception of the environment. Each agent can perceive the
walls of her current cell. Moreover, she knows her own location. Additionally,
the agents are allowed to communicate in order to negotiate the meeting point.
The meeting point can be re-negotiate during the exploration of the maze. The
optimal solution for finding a meeting point requires the knowledge of the whole
maze. Under this assumption, the agents can compute the shortest path between
them and set the meeting point in the middle of it. By contrast, a solution
which does not need any prior knowledge consists of pseudo-randomly selecting
a meeting point in the maze.
In order to illustrate this problem, we consider a 3 × 3 maze (cf Fig.1) at
the second step of the resolution. Each agent computes the distance to reach all
the other cells based on her knowledge. For this purpose, an agent takes into
consideration the perceived walls and she assumes that there is no wall between
the cells she did not visit yet. In other words, the computation is performed
by an A-star algorithm where the future path-cost function is the Manhattan
distance. Since we want to minimize the maximum number of steps for an agent
to reach the meeting point, the cell with the red flag is a good candidate. In
order to solve this distributed solving problem, we use the negotiation protocol
and strategy of [10] which allow to reach a fair solution.
Fig. 1. The maze (at middle) and its internal representation for Alice (at left) and Bob
(at right) at time t = 2. In the latters, the visited cells are in grey, some walls may be
still unknown and each cell is labelled with an estimation of the shortest path length.
Our demonstration exhibits the behaviours of agents exploring several mazes.
These behaviours are the result of iterated negotiation games that take into
account the information gathered by the agents during the exploration.
4 Conclusion
In this demonstration, we have illustrated a negotiation protocol which allows
agents to make more than two offers per round and a negotiation strategy based
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on large (and eventually partial) preferences which does not assume that agents
know the preferences of each other. In this way, we have demonstrated a fair ne-
gotiation process which does not give priority to one agent and which minimizes
the maximum effort of one agent. We have applied our framework for distributed
problem solving. In particular, we have considered the case of two agents in a
maze which aims at negotiating a meeting in order to reach it as soon as possible.
The path between the agents emerges from the repeated negotiations.
We are currently extending our bilateral negotiation game to a multi-party
negotiation game where more than two agents play and observe moves.
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